War and Peace III – The Reinvention of Nuclear Deterrence

1. The Moment That Remains: My Encounter with Joseph Rotblat in the Summer of 2001

Although I was not a witness to the era he described, my encounter with Joseph Rotblat in the summer of 2001 in Oxford became one of those moments that remain. Moreover, it happened only weeks before the world shifted into a new age on September 11. As a result, his words carried a weight that grew larger with time.

Rotblat knew the bomb from the inside and rejected it nonetheless. Furthermore, he left the Manhattan Project when he realized that the bomb was no longer aimed at Hitler but at the world itself. In turn, he later received the Nobel Peace Prize because he understood that the only safe nuclear weapon is the one that does not exist.^[1]

War as Power, Not Morality

A reader once reminded me that war is not automatically a moral mirror. Instead, many wars arise because someone wants more. Consequently, war often becomes action rather than reaction: expansion, ambition, and the old pattern of taking what one desires.

Therefore, the moral burden of nuclear deterrence begins here: What does it mean when a tool of conquest becomes a tool of annihilation, and when annihilation becomes a tool of stability?

2. The Birth of Nuclear Deterrence

Hiroshima and Nagasaki

The history of nuclear deterrence begins with two cities tied to human tragedy. Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, and Nagasaki three days later. Subsequently, two explosions killed tens of thousands within seconds and many more by the end of the year.

If Hiroshima was the first abyss, then Nagasaki was the moment the world understood that the abyss was a decision.

Therefore, the only nation that ever used an atomic bomb became the nation that decides who may be a nuclear power. As a result, this asymmetry shaped the foundation of deterrence.

The Cold War and the Logic of Fear

After the Second World War, the world lay in ruins. Nevertheless, the Cold War created an era in which humanity stood at the edge of catastrophe while stabilizing itself through mutually assured destruction. Consequently, deterrence worked only because both sides remained rational, and because individuals like Stanislav Petrov or Vasili Arkhipov made the right decisions at the right moment.

Nuclear deterrence worked, but only because human beings were wiser than the systems they operated.

The Non‑Proliferation Treaty

The Non‑Proliferation Treaty protects the status quo rather than the world. Although it defines five states as legitimate nuclear powers, it forbids all others from possessing the bomb. Consequently, it became a power cartel shaped by the victors of the Second World War.

3. The Architecture of Nuclear Power

The Historical Guilt of the Official Nuclear Powers

The five official nuclear powers are the states that caused the greatest damage. Moreover, they tested nuclear weapons in Japan, Algeria, Polynesia, Australia, and Xinjiang. Consequently, the moral order is inverted, because those allowed to possess nuclear weapons are the ones that used or tested them most recklessly.

The Unofficial Nuclear Powers

India and Pakistan possess nuclear weapons because they fear each other. However, their security structures differ. India has stable institutions and a clear chain of command. Meanwhile, Pakistan is politically fragile and heavily influenced by the military. As a result, the risk of escalation is structurally higher.

Israel possesses nuclear weapons unofficially but under stable control. Meanwhile, North Korea holds them as a guarantee of survival.

The danger lies not in who has the bomb, but in who believes they must use it.

The Global Paradox

Today, around 12,500 nuclear weapons exist worldwide. Even so, a mere 100 modern warheads could destabilize the global climate permanently. Consequently, humanity possesses enough nuclear weapons to destroy itself multiple times.

The Lost Era of Disarmament

There was a time when disarmament was real. Treaties were signed, diplomats negotiated, and scientists warned. However, that era is gone. Consequently, treaties collapsed, modernization accelerated, and awareness declined.

4. The Reinvention of Nuclear Deterrence

The Declining Awareness of Danger

The generation of witnesses is dying. Furthermore, the peace movement has grown quieter. Meanwhile, popular culture trivializes the bomb because the experience is gone. As a result, politics speaks again in the language of war.

The world has lost its fear of nuclear war, but the bombs retain their danger.

When fear disappears, caution disappears as well. Consequently, only the technology remains — cold, ready, available. As a result, the true danger lies not in deliberate decisions but in mistakes, misunderstandings, or reflexes.

We no longer live in a world dismantling nuclear weapons; we live in a world normalizing them.